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 A  t the TA18 conference on “Technology  Assessment and Normativity”, held  in Vienna in June 2018, an equally spontaneous and memorable con-
troversy arose between Armin Grunwald and 
Pierre Delvenne concerning the roles of neu-
trality and democracy in technology assess-
ment (TA), its philosophical foundations, and 
TA’s obligation to be inclusive. How do TA’s 
obligation to democracy and its operational 
neutrality relate to each other, where do they 
interfere, and what are the practical conse-
quences? And what does this imply for TA’s 
future? Should we shape TA today according 
to the ideals of a strong democracy that advo-
cates value-oriented solutions while not shy-
ing away from conflicts? Or should we rather 
strive for a fundamental normative orienta-
tion toward democracy, which, however, for 
this very reason follows the neutrality prin-
ciple in TA practice and does not favor cer-
tain pathways? As editors of TATuP’s special 
issue on normativity in technology assess-
ment, our intention has been to make this de-
bate accessible to a wider readership by con-
fronting the two researchers once more with 
the core issues of their dispute. Interview by 
Linda Nierling (ITAS, KIT) and Helge Torgersen 
(ITA, Vienna).
Interviewers: Armin Grunwald and 
Pierre Delvenne, in how far can techno-
logy assessment take a neutral role with 
regard to its core task of creating and as-
sembling sound knowledge as a basis for 
policy advice?
Armin Grunwald: On the one hand, I ag-
ree that TA has a normative fundament 
in favor of  – in particular deliberative  – 
democracy and that, with respect to this 
fundament, it is not neutral – besides the 
fact that there is probably no neutral agent 
on this planet at all. However, at the di-
mension and level of specific technolo-
gies under consideration, fulfilling TA’s 
mission according to this fundament re-
quires neutrality or unbiasedness, respec-
tively. Hence, the notion of neutrality 
must be considered in a more differentia-
ted way, at least at the two levels of (a) de-
bates over the political regime and (b) de-
bates on new technology. This different-
iated view on neutrality does not hinder 
TA to be transformative.
Pierre Delvenne: I cannot agree more re-
garding the absence of a neutral agent. In 
the same vein, I do not think that neu-
trality at the dimension of technologies 
is possible. This is because TA practi-
ces and scientific standards are associa-
ted with political preferences and speci-
fic values that hinder the possibility of 
a totally neutral treatment. Not only are 
TA’s rationales and normativities com-
mitted to general ideals such as empowe-
ring publics or enlightening policy. Also, 
TA practices support particular visions of 
the world: both how it is and how it ought 
to be, for instance, with regard to grea-
ter epistemic and social inclusiveness. 
In such a perspective, I do not think that 
technologies and the political context in 
which they take place can be separated. 
Furthermore, and following Sheila Jasa-
noff, I consider that technologies and po-
litical contexts are deeply co-produced. 
This implies that the ways in which we 
know and represent the world (including 
specific technologies) are inseparable 
from the ways in which we choose to live 
in it. If TA wants to fully acknowledge 
and exert its transformative role, it needs 
to take this mutual shaping seriously into 
account, both for a fine-grained unders-
tanding of the technologies to be assessed 
that do not emerge in a political vacuum, 
and to achieve a meaningful impact on 
policy making.
Interviewers: TA is often said to have a 
role in democratic decision making. But 
what exactly is the significance of demo-
cracy for TA and vice versa: what is the 
role of TA within different democratic 
settings? Would you think that TA could 
also serve policy in another system that 
may be less democratic?
Grunwald: In general, I postulate that TA 
is heavily obliged to democracy. History 
clearly supports this: Take the story of 
the US-American Office for Technology 
Assessment, which shows that TA origi-
nated at the core of parliamentary demo-
cracy. Then, there is the history of 50 ye-
ars of TA serving parliaments as the in-
stitutional hearts of democracy. Finally, 
there is the history of TA postulating, 
supporting, and practicing participatory 
and deliberative democracy  – all these 
TA practices support my postulate and 
Pierre’s claim alike. Furthermore, this 
history, and the status reached so far, all-
ows concluding that TA is obliged to de-
mocracy not only in general but also to a 
specific type, namely the “strong” demo-
cracy of Benjamin Barber, or the “deli-
berative” democracy of Jürgen Habermas, 
Frank Fischer, and others. This, however, 
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is “only” an argument derived from his-
tory and practice. Theoretically, TA’s re-
lation to democracy could be subject to 
contingent circumstances, and TA could 
completely change its nature over the ye-
ars to come. For example, TA could be 
hijacked by populist movements or even 
dictators. Yet, would it still be TA if a 
dictator used TA methods and concepts 
for supporting his or her dictatorship and 
to suppress people? In this case, the refe-
rence to former times, when TA was de-
mocratic by its nature, might become a 
historic reminiscence only.
Delvenne: I agree with Armin on TA’s 
democratic obligation or commitment, 
which is related to TA’s history and prac-
tice. And I deeply share the concern of TA 
becoming either the target of populist, ex-
tremist, “post-truth”, or racist politicians 
or of TA becoming an institution led to 
serve disreputable policy goals. But the 
point I like to defend, as elaborated toge-
ther with Céline Parotte, is that TA insti-
tutions and practitioners are not merely 
passive instruments in the hands of the po-
werful. Rather, they possess agency that 
they can and must exert. Thus, it is up to 
them to anticipate the consequences of on-
going political changes, for example, by 
asking themselves three simple questions:
1. Are TA practitioners ready to serve a 
new class of suspicious addressees in 
the exact same way as they have been 
devoting their expertise to policy ma-
king in the past?
2. Are they even able to be of service to 
such policy purposes, given the obvi-
ous divergences with TA’s epistemo-
logies?
3. Are TA practitioners willing to uncri-
tically go down the path of any con-
temporary politics?
Obviously, if asked, I would bluntly ans-
wer NO to all three questions. But there 
may be divergent or more nuanced opini-
ons. In the end, it is up to the individual 
TA practitioners to respond, and their res-
ponses will provide TA communities with 
crucial indications on how, where, and in 
which direction to exert their agency.
Regarding historic reminiscence, TA 
practices will always evolve, just like the 
context in which they unfold. However, 
TA’s historical obligation to democracy 
cannot be buried or forgotten; rather, I 
see it as a compass both for understan-
ding past TA practices and for designing 
those to come. If TA became endangered, 
for example, if democracy gets under the 
attack of populist movements or dictators 
who consider TA to be part of the “esta-
blishment” they want to get rid of or to 
“misrepresent the real people”, TA’s par-
ticular history and set of practices should 
be actively remembered and possibly de-
fended. Thus, in such troubled times, TA 
must become a bastion of democratic po-
litics. In my view, defending democracy 
and knowledge-based policy making is as 
much a moral duty as a survival strategy, 
because the political habitat of TA is de-
mocracy and TA practices can only un-
fold in a democracy that is alive and in-
habited by pluralism.
Interviewers: Is TA’s strong obligation 
to democracy just a historical contin-
gency or is it theoretically rooted in nor-
mative and philosophical foundations  – 
and if so, how?
Grunwald: In fact, TA’s philosophi-
cal foundations provide a stronger argu-
ment for its democratic orientation than 
the mere reference to TA’s history. The 
TA practices we have seen in history, as 
well as those we see today, are deeply roo-
ted in theoretical considerations that are 
not only historically contingent but also 
have strong traditions behind them. The 
very idea of TA originates in the political 
philosophies of John Dewey and Jürgen 
Habermas, going back to ideas of Imma-
nuel Kant and others. Hence, not only his-
tory and the current status of TA supports 
Pierre’s conclusion that TA is not neutral 
at the level of the political regime. Rather, 
TA is obliged to democracy due to its nor-
mative and philosophical roots. This al-
ready implies that TA cannot stay neut-
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the concert of opinions, or should it stay 
away from taking sides?
Grunwald: The obligation of inclusion 
has important consequences indeed. Co-
ming back to the question of neutrality, 
namely, it implies that TA cannot be an 
issue advocate with regard to specific 
technologies, to particular dimensions of 
their consequences, or to specific norms 
and values to be applied for assessing 
them. Rather, TA has to stick to the role 
of the “honest broker” in Pielke’s termin-
ology. This role does not exhaust in acting 
as a neutral moderator in equidistance to 
the positions and perspectives of the ac-
tors and stakeholders involved, as some 
might suggest. In contrast, TA should 
take a clear standpoint in the respective 
public and political debate. However, it 
should only do so if this standpoint is ba-
sed on the results of a TA process that is 
organized according to all of TA’s ideals 
and quality criteria (such as inclusion), 
and if the outcome of this process is a 
clear result, which prioritizes one speci-
fic technology over alternative options – 
for example, in the transformation of the 
energy system. TA would, in such an in-
stance, not act as an issue advocate in the 
same way as a pressure group or lobby-
ist would do.
Delvenne: Why can TA not be an issue 
advocate on technologies? I argue that TA 
cannot be, at the same time, both enga-
ged in defending and preserving demo-
cracy as an issue advocate and pretending 
to be an “honest broker” when it comes 
to choices between technologies that, as 
we know, are inherently (non-)democratic 
and deeply value-laden. In fact, TA is so 
deeply engaged in, and obliged to, demo-
cracy that it cannot pretend that its rooted 
normative advocacy may vanish at the le-
vel of its practices. Armin seems to claim 
that it is both possible and desirable to 
ding in the political sciences that, in this 
model, the existence of conflicts would 
be regarded as a kind of deficit to be over-
come. Rather, the (philosophical) idea be-
hind is only that a real consensus is the 
only way to completely avoid violence. 
Therefore, consensus is nothing more 
than a kind of regulative idea or coun-
terfactual utopia. And even if consensus 
could really be achieved regarding a parti-
cular issue, it immediately would be chal-
lenged in dealing with the next upcoming 
issue. Conflicts are the motor of demo-
cracy, here I agree with Pierre.
Interviewers: If conflicts are the motor 
of democracy, how can TA fulfil its mis-
sion to serve democracy without getting 
involved in the conflicts itself?
Grunwald: Here I would like to empha-
size inclusion as another important con-
ceptual aspect. In fulfilling its mission 
based on the normative fundament of de-
liberative democracy, TA has to observe 
specific values and to consider specific 
conceptual dimensions. According to this 
normative fundament, inclusion is such a 
major value-laden dimension. TA needs 
to assess technology and its possible con-
sequences not only from the perspective 
of the decision makers. Rather, TA has 
to take into account the possibly diverse 
and diverging social perspectives and dif-
ferent pieces of knowledge supplied by 
different actors such as stakeholders, ci-
tizens, and people affected, including fu-
ture generations. Hence, inclusion has 
two sides: TA has to be inclusive in epis-
temic as well as in social respects.
Delvenne: I fully agree.
Interviewers: But doesn’t the inclusion 
of many views and pieces of knowledge 
make things even more complicated? 
And should TA define its stance among 
ral in case democracy comes under pres-
sure. In this respect, TA must be, in the 
terminology of Roger F. Pielke, an issue 
advocate in favor of democracy.
Delvenne: Well, I think that Pielke’s 
terminology and idealized roles may be 
nice as a theoretical concept but are intrin-
sically problematic in practice. Anyway, 
the philosophical foundations Armin 
mentioned are indeed the traditional roots 
of TA. As such, they forcefully influenced 
its ontology and evolving practices. While 
I acknowledge these foundations as evi-
dent and important, which a rich literature 
supports, I think they are not sufficient to 
deal with contemporary politics. Rather, 
TA communities need to look for additio-
nal philosophical resources. In the article 
with Céline Parotte mentioned, we suggest 
that Chantal Mouffe’s theory of pluralis-
tic agonism may be a welcome addition to 
TA’s philosophical library. It provides po-
werful resources for TA to invent its own 
politics, rendering more explicit the poli-
tical normativities and values that under-
lie its actions and projects. Unlike Haber-
mas, Mouffe considers conflict not only 
to be legitimate but also to guarantee that 
democracy is alive and inhabited by plu-
ralism. As Van Bouwel and Van Oudheus-
den stressed, this move marks a clear dif-
ference vis-à-vis deliberative democracy 
theorists in terms of the “meta-consen-
sus” in democratic models, for example, 
regarding the way deliberative reasoning 
and (social) rationality should be unders-
tood and invoked. In other words, the de-
liberative theorists’ meta-consensus pos-
tulates that, in principle, dissent can and 
should be resolved through deliberation 
and rational discussion. In contrast, Mouf-
fe’s meta-consensus is conflictual; it im-
plies an agreement on the impossibility 
to conclusively come to terms with dis-
sent. In addition, according to Mouffe, 
we should not attempt to definitively re-
solve dissent on the meta-level as doing 
so would oppose the very meaning of de-
mocratic pluralism.
Grunwald: I do not share Pierre’s inter-
pretation of Habermas’ model of demo-
cracy. It is a widespread misunderstan-
Technology assessment is obliged to democracy 
due to its normative and philosophical roots.
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mark the difference between TA as an is-
sue advocate for democracy, on the one 
hand, and as an “honest broker” regarding 
specific technologies on the other.
Grunwald: TA relies on the results of 
its own assessments that are performed 
in accordance with its standards, which 
are based on normative ideals such as 
strong democracy and other common 
good-oriented issues. In turn, the ideals 
build on TA’s obligation to inclusion in 
a social as well as epistemic respect. The 
“honest broker” is allowed to follow good 
arguments – but what is to be regarded as 
“good” is related to the quality of the TA 
process according to its normative roots. 
Following good arguments, in this sense, 
and representing positions and conclusi-
ons based on them is categorically dif-
ferent from being in favor of specific 
technologies due to partisan interests or 
stakes like an issue advocate would be.
Delvenne: I think that picturing TA as 
being torn apart between normativity and 
neutrality would be a rather unproductive 
window dressing. First, this incoherence 
may be one of the reasons why it is some-
times hard to explain what TA is, what it 
does, and what it stands for beyond the 
circle of TA communities. Second, it may 
be argued that TA is always acting as an 
issue advocate in practice. After all, it 
shapes normative visions of technologi-
cal futures favoring particular directions 
(such as zero carbon, socially just, redis-
tributive, knowledge- or labor-intensive 
societies) at the expense of other direc-
tions that, at least implicitly, should be 
avoided, such as societies that are extre-
mely polarized, technophobic, or distrust-
ful of evidence or of policy making.
Interviewers: From the discussion so 
far, it is evident that your respective po-
sitions both overlap and diverge. In sum-
mary, where do you see commonalities 
and where do you spot major differen - 
 ces?
Delvenne: I fully agree that TA cannot 
stay neutral if democracy comes under 
pressure. And we probably also agree on 
the fact that democracy today, in Europe 
and elsewhere in the world, comes under 
increasing pressure. Thus, we may even 
agree that, given this worrisome situation, 
TA’s “neutrality myth” has to be recon-
sidered and a politics of TA needs to be 
invented. Where I see us bifurcate is on 
the significance of neutrality. Armin still 
seems attached to a certain level of – in 
my view mythical – neutrality that could 
still be preserved somehow and that 
would even be necessary. I think TA is ne-
ver neutral, not regarding its foundations 
and neither at the level of specific techno-
logies. A quick look at the actual way how 
TA frames technological issues and at the 
actual themes and conclusions of TA re-
ports may support this claim. Regarding 
how to invent a politics of TA that would 
be attuned to the situated political context 
and the civic epistemology in which each 
TA institute operates, my view is that TA 
needs, in addition to John Dewey’s or Jür-
gen Habermas’ concepts, other philoso-
phical resources such as Chantal Mouf-
fe’s pluralistic agonism.
Grunwald: To conclude, Pierre and I 
seem to share many positions with re-
gard to TA’s basic obligation to demo-
cracy and the role it has in serving and de-
fending it. I think we agree on TA being 
an instrument in and for democratic rea-
soning and decision making on techno-
logies, based on values and ideas of a 
“strong democracy” that must be defen-
ded if coming under pressure. However, 
it is exactly this obligation that calls for 
inclusiveness and this, in turn, entails not 
taking an open stance on the level of ma-
terial questions, for example, whether to 
favor this or that interest over any other. 
Rather, this obligation demands relying 
on the results of a TA process carried out 
according to the fundamental values in-
herent in the normative core of TA.
Technology assessment is never neutral, 
not regarding its foundations and neither 
at the level of specific technologies.
The obligation of inclusion implies that technology assessment 
cannot be an issue advocate with regard to specific technologies, 
or to specific norms and values to be applied for assessing them.
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